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Executive Summary
As Mozambique recovers from war and undergoes economic reform, given its favorable
agro-ecological endowment and its highly rural population, improved agricultural
performance is essential to three Government policy objectives: 1) smallholder income
growth; 2) improved rural food security; and 3) reducing the balance of payments deficit.  In
the context of near complete input and credit market failure in rural areas, policy-makers are
faced with the challenge of how to achieve these micro- and macroeconomic goals.  In the
north, the Government formed Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) with three multi-national
agro-industrial firms to rehabilitate cotton infrastructure in 1990 with the hope that this
would contribute toward achieving these goals.  In return for monopsony cotton-buying
rights in their respective areas of influence, the JVCs agreed to provide participating
smallholders with reliable input supplies and extension services for cotton and food crops
and to purchase seed cotton from farmers at official price levels.  The firms also agreed to
invest in the rehabilitation of cotton ginneries and rural road networks in their areas of
influence.  The desire to understand the effects of smallholder:JVC cash-cropping with
respect to Government policy goals was the motivation of a socio-economic study conducted
in Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries /
Michigan State University Food Security Project (MAP/MSU FSP) from 1994 to 1996. 
Key conclusions from the study include:
￿ In both principal study zones (Montepuez and Monapo/Meconta), cotton producers
grew greater quantities of maize than households with no cotton production.  Empirical
evidence thus shows that cash-cropping can have a positive effect on smallholder food
production.  Further, households who grew cotton with the high-input package but who grew
low-input maize had significantly greater maize yields per hectare than their neighbors in
low-input cotton schemes.
￿ Low-input cotton production raised smallholder per capita income by between 25
and 36 percent in the zones of significant JVC investment, based on econometric analyses
of the determinants of per capita income. Cotton's effect on an indicator of smallholder food
security - hungry season cereal reserves - was positive and significant among low-input
growers in Montepuez, and positive but statistically insignificant among households in other
cotton production categories in Montepuez and Monapo/Meconta.  In other parts of Nampula
Province, with very minor private sector investment in input distribution and extension
services, low-input cotton had a negative effect on income and little effect on hungry season
cereal reserves.  The finding that, holding constant other factors, low-input cotton contributes
positively to smallholder income in areas of significant JVC investment, though less so to
food availability is a key result.  This suggests the importance of a significant JVC
investment in a given zone for smallholder cotton to deliver these benefits in the current
policy environment.
￿ ￿ The benefits to smallholders, the country and private sector firms supporting smallholder
cotton increase dramatically where smallholders grow cotton with fertilizer and herbicide. 
The same econometric estimatation technique showed that high-input cotton increased
per capita income by between 97 and 138 percent relative to non-cotton growers.iv
Intensification was also shown to be positively associated with greater smallholder food
production and hungry season cereal reserves.
￿ ￿ Within the two principal study zones and across cotton production categories, cotton
and maize yields varied significantly.  Yield equations identified early seeding, sufficient
weeding labor, and adequate insecticide applications (for cotton) as key factors related to
productivity. 
￿ ￿ For smallholder:JVC relationships to be sustainable, the JVCs must be financially
profitable enterprises.  In both principal study zones, low-input and high-input cotton were
profitable to the JVCs, generating returns from $56 to $127 per hectare under current yield
and world market conditions.
￿ ￿ Cotton domestic resource cost ratios ranged from 0.42 to 0.65, indicating a
comparative advantage for the cotton belt in both low-input and high-input packages. 
Sensitivity analysis showed that these estimates were robust to variation in world cotton
prices experienced over the past ten years.
￿ ￿ The cotton belt is currently an inefficient producer of maize for markets outside the
region such as Maputo.  Even assuming improved yields and lower per unit production
costs, the high costs of coastal shipping, inefficient port operations and a poor domestic
highway network result in the north currently having a comparative disadvantage in maize. 
However, the fact that the north's rainfall patterns are not correlated with those in the
rest of the Southern Africa region and the potential, with appropriate investments, to
develop its strategic position vis-a-vis ports and rail lines suggests that it could become
an important supplier of maize (and other food crops) to the region.
Policy Recommendations and Priorities for Future Research
￿ Smallholder cotton can have important micro- and macroeconomic benefits if it is
promoted with a sufficient level of inputs, extension and marketing infrastructure.
Intensification of cotton has even greater benefits for each of the actors in the system.  The
GOM should promote smallholder cotton production in the cotton belt through
strategies which effectively balance smallholder and private sector interests in pursuing
vertical coordination of the subsector.
￿ Improving smallholder capacity to represent their own interests vis-a-vis private sector
firms in the cotton subsector can be an important mechanism to improve the effect of cash-
cropping on smallholder welfare.  In a zone similar to Mozambique's cotton belt in Mali,
farmer associations have represented an important way for farmers to achieve greater power
and gain access to fertilizers and other key inputs.  Farmer associations have the potential to
play a similar role in Mozambique.   The GOM and donors should promote the formation
of farmer associations to promote smallholder's bargaining power with private sector
firms. 
￿ ￿ The process by which the GOM determines minimum producer prices for cotton
should be reviewed.  Yearly changes in the GOM cotton price have not reflected changes inv
world market conditions.  For example, the official price jumped from $0.16 to $0.34 per kg
from 1994/95 to 1995/96 while FOB Northern Mozambique prices for cotton fiber dropped
from $1,715 to $1,438.  Such erratic price policies make long range investment planning by
the JVCs and other private sector firms difficult and create unsustainable price expectations
and uncertainty for smallholders. 
￿ The Mozambique Cotton Institute lacks the institutional capacity and resources to
represent smallholder interests effectively.  However, governmental oversight to encourage
JVC behavior to benefit smallholders throughout their areas of influence is important.  The
GOM should seek new and innovative mechanisms to bring this about such as having
Institute representation in the decision-making structure of the JVCs, given that the
Government is in fact a partner in these schemes.
￿ If the GOM wishes to encourage JVC involvement in smallholder food crop
intensification, establishing a minimum producer price at recently observed levels may be
counter-productive.  The GOM should seek policies designed to increase rural incomes
through productivity enhancing technology packages rather than through an
unsustainable minimum price policy.  JVCs have an important stake in improving rural
food security and innovative mechanisms should be sought to encourage their participation.
￿ Development of cotton varieties with enhanced ginning outturn ratios is the subject of
research attention by the national agricultural research system.  The Government and
donors should place renewed focus on this effort.      Readers interested in more detail concerning analytical techniques used and a more
1
complete reporting of study results should see Smallholder Cash-Cropping, Food-Cropping
and Food Security, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Paul J. Strasberg (1997), a reprint of
which was published as MAP/MSU FSP Research Report No. 24.
      For a more complete discussion of sampling strategies used in this study, see MAP/MSU
2
FSP Working Paper No. 22 (1996).
1
I. Introduction
As Mozambique recovers from war and undergoes economic reform, given its favorable
agro-ecological endowment and its highly rural population, improved agricultural
performance is essential to three Government policy objectives: 1) smallholder income
growth; 2) improved rural food security; and 3) reducing the balance of payments deficit.  In
the context of near complete input and credit market failure in rural areas, policy-makers are
faced with the challenge of how to achieve these micro- and macroeconomic goals.  In the
north of the country, the Government formed Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) with three
multi-national agro-industrial firms to rehabilitate cotton infrastructure in 1990 with the hope
that this would contribute toward achieving these goals.  In return for monopsony cotton-
buying rights in their respective areas of influence, the JVCs agreed to provide participating
smallholders with reliable input supplies and extension services for cotton and food crops
and to purchase seed cotton from farmers at official price levels.  The firms also agreed to
invest in the rehabilitation of cotton ginneries and rural road networks in their areas of
influence.  The desire to understand the effects of smallholder:JVC cash-cropping with
respect to Government policy goals was the motivation of a socio-economic study conducted
in Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries /
Michigan State University Food Security Project (MAP/MSU FSP) from 1994 to 1996.  This
document highlights key study findings and their implications for formulating strategies to
promote rural economic growth and food security.  To place the study's findings into context,
there is a brief review of the study's background, objectives and methodology.
1
A. Background and Objectives
There is a controversy over whether cash-cropping improves smallholder welfare in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA).  This is despite results from a range of SSA experience showing that
cash-cropping typically has a strongly positive effect on smallholder incomes and a smaller
but still positive effect on food consumption.  A key finding from much of the SSA cash-
cropping literature is that the effects on participating families depend critically on the
organizational details of the scheme.  The three JVCs that have operated in the cotton belt
since 1990 have provided smallholders with a variety of cash- and food-cropping packages. 
Details about the three JVCs are provided in Table 1.  Figure 1 shows those parts of the three
JVCs' areas of influence included in the FSP sample in Nampula and Cabo Delgado









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Districts of Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces in FSP and CARE Samples       Blocks are relatively large tracts of land on which a number of smallholders each work
3
0.5 - 3.0 ha parcels.  Smallholders typically do not consider themselves to have any tenure
security on these blocks.
4
In the areas of influence of SODAN and SAMO, in Monapo and Meconta Districts, the
smallholder:JVC relationship has been limited to "low-input cotton," where insecticide and
improved seed are the only modern inputs used.  Here farmers cultivate cotton either on their
own "dispersed" fields or on "block" fields established during the colonial era.  
3
Approximately 80 percent of smallholders in this zone grew low-input cotton during the
1994/95 season.  According to smallholder surveys, these JVCs provided no support to
smallholders for food crop production or marketing. 
In Montepuez, where 27 percent of rural households grew cotton in 1994/95, "high-" and
"low-" input packages were available to smallholders from Lomaco.  Most cotton-growing
households used a low-input package similar to that in Monapo/Meconta.  A pilot group of
farmers used an innovative "high-input" package that included herbicide, fertilizer and
insecticide (and in some cases tractorization) for cotton.  A subset of these high-input cotton
growers also participated in a high-input maize scheme with Lomaco.  This high-input group
was unique at the time the study began in rural Mozambique for two reasons.  These were the
only smallholders 1) using either herbicide or fertilizer or receiving tractorization services;
and 2) receiving JVC support to produce and market maize.  In a nearby region with no
significant JVC presence (CARE-OPEN), one-third of rural households grew cotton in
1994/95..
The considerable variation found in smallholder:JVC relationships represented an attractive
quasi-experimental design upon which this study was based.  Specifically, the research was
designed to achieve the following objectives:
1) Describe the food security strategies of smallholders in the cotton belt;
2) Analyze the determinants of agricultural productivity in cotton and maize;
3) Compare the financial profitability of cotton, maize and manioc from the
smallholder and JVC perspectives at varying levels of agricultural intensification;
4) Determine the extent to which the region enjoys a comparative advantage in
smallholder cotton, maize and manioc based on the range of existing technologies;
5) Determine the extent to which households enjoy differential levels of income and
food security based on their cotton production category, and the role of the JVC-
schemes in causing this differential; and
6) Recommend key policy changes, investments, project initiatives and additional
research necessary to improve the contribution of cash-cropping to smallholder food
security, income and macroeconomic goals.5












(7) (9) (5) (21)
-----  Number of Households  -----
High-input block cotton
and maize
39 n.a. n.a. 39
High-input dispersed
cotton
27 n.a. n.a. 27
Low-input block cotton
only
n.a. 47 n.a. 47
Low-input dispersed
cotton
78 86 48 212
No cotton 57 42 97 196
Total 201 175 145 521
 Household Production Category as of December, 1994.
1
Source: 1994/96 MAP/MSU Smallholder Survey
Table 2.  Final Sample Design, Rounds 2-5 (January 1995 - January 1996)
To address these research questions, 521 rural households across the cotton belt were
surveyed at four month intervals between June 1994 and February 1996.  A stratified random
sample within the areas of influence of the three principal JVCs was drawn in order to
include households involved in the range of cotton production categories (high-input  block,
high-input dispersed, low-input block, low-input dispersed) present in each zone.  Table 2
shows the number of rural households interviewed in each zone broken down by the
household production category.  In the CARE-OPEN zone, a sample of cotton growers was
drawn allowing a comparison of the effects of growing cotton with much less JVC support
than in Montepuez or Monapo/Meconta.  Also, non-cotton growers were sampled in each
zone to represent a control group as part of the quasi-experimental design.  For each survey
round, questionnaires were devised with the objective of computing annual 
estimates of agricultural production and sales, income, labor use and food consumption for
each sampled household.  
While the smallholder survey represents the centerpiece of the overall research design, key
informant interviews were also conducted with officials from the JVCs, agricultural research6
institutions, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and non-governmental organizations. 
Information from these interviews was useful toward understanding the broader economic
environment in which cotton belt households operate.
B. Analytical Techniques
To address the research objectives outlined above, four complementary analytical methods
were used.  First, plot-level regression models of the determinants of cotton and maize yields
among sampled households were estimated, allowing quantification of the effects of key
inputs and practices on productivity in the two crops.  Second, financial profitability of
cotton, maize and manioc to farmers was analyzed through the use of enterprise budgets. 
Budgets were computed for high-input cotton and maize schemes in Montepuez, low-input
cotton schemes in both Montepuez and Monapo/Meconta and traditional low-input maize and
manioc enterprises in both zones.  Due a high degree of variation in yield and input use
within groups, budgets were broken out by yield tercile.  Financial outcomes of the various
schemes from the JVC perspective were also analyzed.
Third, parameters generated in the financial budgets were used to investigate under what
conditions Mozambique enjoys comparative advantage in the set of cotton, maize and manioc
enterprises and technology packages discussed above.  Thus, incorporating all economic
costs of production, transformation and marketing, this macroeconomic analysis compared
the production alternatives most attractive to the country in terms of its trade balance to those
found most financially profitable to smallholders and the JVCs.  The attractiveness of the
various cropping choices to smallholders, the JVCs and the macroeconomy depend on
assumptions regarding key parameters (e.g., input level, the ginning outturn rate for cotton
and producer and world prices); sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine how
variation in these parameters affect each group.
Finally, econometric models of annual household income and food security were developed




This section discusses key conclusions from the study.  Likewise, Tables 3 and 4 display
selected results by study zone and cotton production category.
￿ ￿ Cotton belt households depend on retained production to meet more than 80 percent
of their calorie consumption needs, though the role of food markets has increased from
war-time levels.  Households that must buy food in the hungry season face cereal prices two
to three times greater than harvest season levels, suggesting that food markets still represent
an unreliable option for many food insecure households with limited effective demand.  With
the vast majority of smallholders using unimproved local varieties of maize and other
cereals, determining how to increase smallholder access to improved varieties and other
modern inputs for food production represents a priority for improving rural food security.7
￿ ￿ Reliance on the market for food purchases increased substantially during the hungry
season for most farmers.  This tendency was especially strong in Nampula and less strong
but still apparent for low input and non- cotton growers in Montepuez.  High input cotton
growers in Montepuez did not increase their reliance on the market during the hungry season.
￿ ￿ In both principal study zones (Montepuez and Monapo/Meconta), cotton producers
grew greater quantities of maize than households with no cotton production.  Empirical
evidence thus contradicts the claim that cash-cropping has a negative effect on food
production in this case.  Further, households who grew cotton with the high-input package
but who grew low-input maize had significantly greater maize yields per hectare than their
neighbors in low-input cotton schemes.
￿ ￿ Within the two principal study zones and across cotton production categories, cotton
and maize yields varied significantly.  With respect to cotton, yield equations identified
early seeding, sufficient weeding labor, and adequate insecticide applications as key factors
related to productivity.  A benefit:cost ratio of 1.8:1 indicated the profitability of increasing
the number of insecticide applications above current mean levels.  For those households in
low-input cotton schemes in the lowest yield tercile, returns to family labor were very low
compared to wage rates paid for unskilled agricultural labor.  Poor results were associated
with late planting, insufficient insecticide and inadequate weeding labor.
￿ ￿ The highest returns to labor were in high-input cotton and maize schemes in
Montepuez.  An attractive benefit:cost ratio (of 1.5 to 2.5:1) of the high input cotton
package suggests that effective application of herbicide and fertilizer is profitable for
smallholders.  The high-input maize scheme had a private benefit:cost ratio of 1.3:1 on
average.  However, the riskiness of these schemes, from both the smallholder and JVC
perspectives was highlighted by extreme yield variation in maize, where nearly one-third of
participants suffered financial losses.  An attractive attribute of high-input cotton production,
from both the smallholder and JVC perspectives, is that it is generally less risky than high-
input maize for two reasons.  First, cotton is relatively more drought resistant than maize. 
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Source: 1994/96 MAP/MSU FSP Smallholder Survey
Table 4. Selected Macroeconomic- and JVC-Level Measures of Profitability,
Cotton and Maize
the world market and is therefore a price taker.  On the other hand, domestic and regional
maize market conditions are more volatile.  For both crops, however, intensification
increases the potential value of production for credit-constrained farmers as it also raises
costs and risk.  This increased risk for Lomaco in high-input maize has translated into
significant financial losses due to lack of credit repayment.  Developing mechanisms for
dealing with intra-annual risk that simultaneously promote intensification are critical to the
long-run sustainability of these schemes.  The role that farmer-based associations may play in
this effort is discussed below.
￿ ￿ Low-input cotton production raised smallholder per capita income by between 25
and 36 percent in the zones of significant JVC investment, based on econometric analyses
of the determinants of per capita income.  Cotton's effect as an indicator of smallholder food
security - hungry season cereal reserves - was positive and significant among low-input
growers in Montepuez, and positive but statistically insignificant among households in other
cotton production categories in Montepuez and Monapo/Meconta.  In CARE-OPEN, with
very minor private sector investment in input distribution and extension services, low-input
cotton had a negative effect on income and little effect on hungry season cereal reserves. 
The finding that, holding constant other factors, low-input cotton contributes positively to
smallholder income in areas of significant JVC investment, though less so to food availability
is a key result.  Contrasting this finding with the results in CARE-OPEN suggests the
importance of a significant JVC investment in a given zone for smallholder cotton to
deliver these benefits in the current policy environment.10
￿ ￿ High-input cotton increased per capita income by between 97 and 138 percent
relative to non-cotton growers, based on the same econometric analysesHouseholds in the
high-input (or PUPI) category in Montepuez also enjoyed relatively greater hungry season
cereal reserves.  It is likely that those households with relatively greater management and
farming skills were more likely to be chosen to participate in the high-input schemes than
their neighbors.  The study controlled for these pre-program differences between high-input
cotton households and the rest of the sample and still found that intensification more than
doubled smallholder incomes. 
￿ ￿ For smallholder:JVC relationships to be sustainable, the JVCs must be financially
profitable enterprises.  In both principal study zones, low-input and high-input cotton were
profitable to the JVCs, generating returns from $56 to $127 per hectare under current yield
and world market conditions.
￿ ￿ Sensitivity analysis showed that increasing the cotton ginning outturn rate from its
current 34 percent to 40 percent or greater through varietal improvements such as
those which have occurred in Francophone West Africa would significantly contribute
toward achieving macroeconomic goals as well as JVC profits.   Smallholders would also
benefit from this technology improvement, as JVCs would be in a position to pay higher producer
prices.
￿ Financial analysis showed that if JVCs had to operate under current maize market
conditions, they would suffer financial losses in high-input block maize, attributable
largely to high costs of shipping grain to major markets.  JVC involvement in
smallholder food production in Mozambique was limited to Lomaco’s high-input block
maize scheme in Montepuez when this study began.  Lomaco ended this program in 1995/96,
coinciding with the end of donor-driven emergency-related maize demand from elsewhere in
the country. 
￿ ￿ Cotton domestic resource cost ratios ranged from 0.42 to 0.65, indicating a
comparative advantage for the cotton belt in both low-input and high-input packages. 
Sensitivity analysis showed that these estimates were robust to variation in world cotton
prices experienced over the past ten years.
￿ ￿ The cotton belt is currently an inefficient producer of maize for markets outside the
region such as Maputo.  Even assuming improved yields and lower per unit production
costs, the high costs of coastal shipping, inefficient port operations and a poor domestic
highway network result in the north currently having a comparative disadvantage in maize. 
However, the fact that the north's rainfall patterns are not correlated with those in the rest of
the Southern Africa region and its strategic position close to ports suggests that, with
appropriate investments, it could become an important supplier of maize (and other food
crops) to the region.11
III. Implications for Strategies to Promote Economic Growth and Food
Security
This study shows clearly that cotton production can and frequently does benefit northern
Mozambican smallholders and the national economy.  Smallholders in the areas of influence
of the three principal JVCs operating in the cotton belt have substantially higher incomes
than their non-cotton growing neighbors because they choose to produce this cash crop. 
Income gains accrue to smallholders who grow cotton without compromising, and sometimes
improving their food security.  These findings are significant, given the frequent criticism
that smallholder cash-cropping in Sub-Saharan Africa jeopardizes food security.
Mozambique urgently needs strategies to increase the export of products in which it has a
comparative advantage.  This study shows that Mozambique has a comparative advantage in
smallholder cotton using the range of input packages currently promoted by the JVCs.
Prior to the agreements between the Government of Mozambique and Lonrho, João Ferreira
dos Santos and Grupo Entreposto, a much smaller proportion of rural households in the
cotton belt were growing cotton than at present.  Those who were producing cotton had little
access to agricultural inputs or credit because market mechanisms were not available, state
companies charged with developing cotton production had largely collapsed, and no private
firms had yet filled this role.  Cotton yields were very low, its effect on household income
was negligible and its impact at the macroeconomic level was insignificant.  In recent years,
this poor performance has been reversed in the regions which have been the focus of GOM
and private investment.  In regions without this level of investment but with similar agro-
ecological conditions and colonial histories (e.g., CARE-OPEN), relatively small proportions
of farmers grow cotton and those who do so show no higher incomes than non-cotton
growers.  Key factors instrumental in cotton's resurgence as an important cash crop have
been  the revitalization of input distribution and extension networks and improvements in
rural roads.  The region's three JVCs have been important players in this process.
The benefits to smallholders, the country and private sector firms supporting smallholder
cotton increase dramatically where smallholders grow cotton with fertilizer and herbicide. 
Among households who produced cotton with the PUPI package, some used a similar
package for maize while others used a traditional approach to this food crop.  It is
noteworthy that both groups obtained significantly greater maize yields than households who
did not intensify cotton production.  This suggests that cotton intensification can have a
substantial effect on improving smallholder maize productivity and improving household
food security.  It is likely that a portion of the differences in maize yield between high-input
cotton/low-input maize households compared to low-input cotton/low-input maize
households is related to residual fertilizer and rotation effects from cotton to maize.  Given
the reluctance of private sector firms to support maize intensification directly due to its
relatively high level of risk compared to cotton, (and the probable reluctance of smallholders
to independently intensify their maize production for the same reasons) cotton intensification
may represent a useful indirect means to intensify maize production and increase yields.  The
intersection of smallholder and JVC interests here is important.  As smallholder productivity
in food crops increases, farmers are able to devote more resources to producing cotton.   The       The term “vertical coordination” refers to the process of coordinating the actions of
4
participants at different levels in a subsector with the objective of maximizing benefits for all
concerned.  In the cotton subsector, participants include farmers, JVCs, and various
government agencies.  In a less vertically-integrated subsector, other participants would
include input dealers and traders of the output.  The actions of all these participants need to
be coordinated in order to ensure timely delivery of inputs, effective research and extension
assistance, appropriate production practices by farmers, and efficient processing and
marketing of output, among other activities.
12
increased cotton production is attractive to the JVCs, given that existing cotton gins are
operating well below capacity.
In short, investments made by private firms in providing inputs, credit and extension services
to smallholders, as well as investing in rural road development have made important
contributions to the cotton belt's  economic recovery.  Given the potential for improving
smallholder incomes and food security in the north through cash-cropping, the GOM needs
to give priority to determining an appropriate policy environment for such development to
move forward.  In so doing, the GOM needs to address three questions:
1) Does the fact that benefits to smallholders are greatest in areas of significant JVC
investment imply that the "JVC model" has been successful and should be replicated
elsewhere?
2) What alternative models are possible and would they provide greater benefits for
smallholders? 
3) What more can be done by government and the private sector to improve
smallholder cash-cropping performance?
In the next sections, we will consider what the results from this study and other Sub-Saharan
Africa experience imply about the steps that the GOM, donors, private sector actors and
smallholders should take to answer these questions and ensure that cash-cropping continues
to contribute to rural development in Mozambique.
A. The JVC Model: Its Rationale, Advantages and Disadvantages
The JVCs have had legal geographic monopsonies with respect to smallholder cotton since
their inception.  This model, which attempts to ensure effective vertical coordination  of the
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subsector by granting buying rights to a single firm, is an unusual policy in Southern Africa
today; the trend is clearly toward not providing monopsony protection to companies involved
in promoting smallholder cash-cropping. 
Major donors including both USAID and the World Bank have voiced criticism of the legal
monopsony model for promoting smallholder cotton in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The two
principal arguments against this model is that it retards development of private input markets13
and limits price competition for smallholder outputs.  Yet there were solid reasons why the
GOM chose this model.
The standard economic argument - though only part of the GOM rationale - for granting a
JVC exclusive cotton buying rights is that the economics of transport and processing cotton
in a given zone give rise to a natural monopsony.  That is, given the economies of scale in
the ginning process, the quantity of cotton produced in each zone is insufficient to achieve
efficiency in ginning costs.  If this were the case, economic theory would imply that the state
has a role in limiting the number of gins operating in a region.  The extent to which natural
monopsony conditions are present in specific regions of the cotton belt is a complex
empirical question and was an area beyond the scope of this study.  However, this issue was
only one, albeit important factor in motivating the GOM to grant JVCs geographic
monopsonies.  Of equal or greater importance to the GOM was developing a private sector-
based policy mechanism to spark a resurgence in smallholder cotton by facilitating vertical
coordination in the subsector.  To generate growth in production, it was necessary to develop
an input distribution and extension network.  Another important barrier with respect to
economic growth in this region was the investment needed to repair and maintain the rural
road network after much neglect and damage from the war.  The GOM lacked the capital to
make such investments and was faced with the dilemma of how to attract private capital to
this region.
To any private firm, an investment in roads and cotton ginning infrastructure to develop
smallholder cotton represented a long-term endeavor.  A key factor in the decision of such a
firm whether or not to invest would be its ability to ensure adequate capacity utilization in its
cotton gin.  Aware of the region's input market failure and the need for increased access by
smallholders to inputs to jumpstart cotton production, the vertically-integrated approach built
around JVCs represented an attractive option.  As this model has functioned since its
inception, each cropping season the JVCs distribute inputs to smallholders on credit.   Intra-
annual financing costs and risk of repayment have been largely borne by the JVCs (though
the KR-II pesticide subsidy has lowered JVC exposure).  In this context, government granted
monopsony rights to the JVCs to encourage their investment by protecting them from other
buyers who neither bear the production and credit risks during the growing season, nor the
upstream investments in rural infrastructure. 
Would competition for smallholder production improve smallholder welfare and the system's
performance more broadly?  Insights from an analogous situation in Zambia where Lonrho is
supporting smallholder cotton highlight the limitations of competition and the importance of
effective contract enforcement for cash-cropping schemes to be sustainable:
"From the farmer's perspective, competition among buyers is positive.  But where this
competition undermines existing contracts between buyers and producers, outgrower
type arrangements which involve pre-financing are likely to disappear...For
commodities with minimal extension and input requirements, the impact on the
producer may be limited if he/she is able to finance and manage his/her own
production.  But where these requirements are considerable (e.g., cotton), the
smallholder is likely to find that he/she can no longer...(effectively) produce the
commodity (due to the lack of input availability and financing)." (Stringfellow, 1996)14
Stringfellow's analysis of the Zambia case suggests that as the GOM approaches policy issues
related to the cotton subsector, it is important to implement arrangements which will lead to
effective vertical coordination among key actors.  Applying the lessons from Zambia to the
Mozambican case, the GOM may observe that encouraging competition by eliminating the
JVCs’ geographic monopsonies, in isolation from other key steps, is not likely to result in
effective vertical coordination in the face of input and credit market failure.  While it may be
useful to promote competition for smallholder cotton, complementary investments in the
subsector(e.g., in input distribution, extension, human capital and rural infrastructure) will be
required to promote meaningful development of smallholder cash-cropping opportunities
outside of the JVC framework.
B. How to Improve Government Regulation 
When the state grants monopsony rights to a firm, it must regulate the firm's behavior to
guard against potentially abusive practices.  In the context of the cotton belt and the JVCs,
examples of potentially abusive practices include failure of the JVCs to provide inputs, credit
or extension services to smallholders in a timely manner or offering an unreasonably low
producer price for cotton.  The GOM uses two regulatory mechanisms for this purpose. 
First, and most importantly, the GOM establishes a minimum producer price each year. 
Recent experience suggests that the use of price policy has been unsuccessful in fixing the
farmgate price at levels which balance JVC and smallholder interests given world market
conditions.  For example, in 1994/95 when world price levels were historically high ($1,715
per ton, FOB Nacala) the official producer price was quite low ($0.16 per kg seed cotton). 
To compensate smallholders for this disparity in the following year, the GOM more than
doubled the official price (to $0.34 per kg seed cotton) even though world cotton prices had
fallen to $1,438 per ton, FOB Nacala.
The second mechanism by which the GOM attempts to protect smallholders is through the
Mozambique Cotton Institute.  A central purpose of the Institute is to ensure that all
smallholders within a given JVC's area of influence receive reasonable access to inputs and
extension services.  For example, it may be more profitable from the JVC's perspective to
concentrate its input distribution on smallholders whose fields are relatively close to a road. 
However, the JVC is also required to support production for smallholders in more remote
locations within its area of influence, even if this is more costly.  Without such support,
smallholders in relatively remote locations have no other option to obtain inputs and market
their cotton, given the monopsony granted to the JVC and the lack of private sector firms to
provide these services.  What has been the experience of the Institute in regulating JVC
performance in this regard?
To gain insight into this question, we draw an important distinction between two empirical
results from the study: 1) that cotton, on average, has benefited smallholders in the JVC-
intensive zones; and 2) that a significant group of smallholders in each JVC zone had very
low cotton yields and hence very low returns to labor in cotton. For example, seed cotton
yields among the lowest tercile of producers were only 200 kg/ha (Montepuez) and 155
kg/ha (Monapo/Meconta), compared to mean yields well above 500 kg/ha in both zones. 
Returns to family labor for households in the lowest yield tercile were at or below $0.22 per       These actions have been criticized for promoting cotton production in marginal areas
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where it is not likely to be profitable.
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day, compared to mean returns above $0.60 per day and local wage labor rates of $0.48 per
day.
The most important factors associated with cotton's relatively poor performance among
households in the lowest cotton yield tercile were the lack of insecticide, late planting and a
shortage of labor for weeding.  Households in the lowest yield tercile typically sprayed
insecticide two times or less, against a recommended application rate of approximately four
sprays per season.  This suggests that JVC input distribution has essentially not corrected the
market failure for this significant group of households.  The Mozambique Cotton Institute, to
date, has lacked the resources to effectively monitor and encourage JVC compliance with
their agreements with the GOM.  Given both the need for effective GOM involvement in the
subsector and the current limitations of the Institute, how should the GOM approach this
issue?
The Institute as it is currently structured operates largely as an administrative body in areas
of JVC activity (Fok, 1995).  Actions by the Institute to encourage smallholder cotton
production have been limited to areas where JVCs do not operate.   The GOM should
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consider how to transform the Institute into a body which acts as a catalyst to promote the
interests of key subsector actors, including smallholders, JVCs and other private sector firms
(e.g., input suppliers and gin operators).  Further, the GOM should consider how its
representatives could become active participants in the leadership of the JVCs to represent
smallholder interests, given that Government is part owner in each JVC.
The Institute could also play an important role in promoting a dialogue among key public
and private actors at the national, regional and local levels on how to improve subsector
performance.  Improving the Institute's data collection and analysis capacity would be
strategic in this regard.  For example, regular published reports about performance at various
levels of the subsector could serve an important role in providing solid empirical information
upon which to base the policy dialogue.
C. What Can Be Done to Increase JVC Support to Smallholder Food
Crops?
The JVCs' contracts call for extension systems to be developed for both cotton and food
crops.  Study results found that the JVC extension systems, with few exceptions, have been
singularly focused on cotton.  The only significant JVC entry into supporting smallholder
food production was the now defunct high-input block maize scheme in Montepuez and
surrounding districts.  Results from this study suggest that both smallholders and the JVCs
may benefit from JVC support of smallholder food-cropping.  Recall that late planting and a
shortage of labor for weeding were two key factors in reducing cotton yields.  The study also
found a positive relationship between household hungry season cereal reserves and
household ability to allocate labor to cotton, thus improving cotton yields.  The implication is
that cotton production may increase substantially as smallholder food security improves;       The key difference between the new reference price policy and the old minimum price
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policy is that the former makes it clear that no one is legally obligated to pay the reference
price; there will be no legal sanctions against anyone paying less than this price.
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there is the potential for private sector firms to be important actors in this process (e.g.,
recent experiments by Lomaco in intensified smallholder groundnut and cowpea production). 
Once again the mutuality of interests between smallholders and JVCs is apparent: improved
food security for smallholders may result in increased smallholder cotton production,
generating higher ginning capacity utilization rates and higher profits for the JVCs.
To date, the GOM has not taken significant steps to encourage JVC support to smallholder
food crop production and/or marketing.  Past minimum price policy on maize was counter-
productive in this regard, in the sense that Government established price levels which
Lomaco could not pay to smallholders and still earn a profit within the current maize market
environment.  Support to smallholder food cropping could be profitable to the JVCs and
generate attractive returns to smallholder labor if mean yields could be increased to the level
of current upper tercile yields and if the JVCs were allowed to pay a market price consistent
with marketing costs.  In this regard, the recent move to a reference price policy, as opposed
to a minimum price policy, is a positive development .  It needs to be complemented by other
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decisions to create a policy environment conducive to increasing food production (and
improving regional food security) through productivity-enhancing technology packages with
an attractive set of incentives for both producers and private sector firms. 
D. Lessons from Experience in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mali
As the GOM and private actors search for ways of improving the performance of food and
cash crops in northern Mozambique, it would be useful to consider what lessons can be
drawn from alternative approaches to this challenge in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mali.
In Zambia, Lonrho's outgrower scheme now incorporates 65,000 growers with no legal
monopsony.  Despite its success in managing the scheme, Lonrho is gradually withdrawing
from direct managerial involvement, hoping to pass this responsibility to smaller
intermediary companies which it will finance and from which it will purchase seed cotton. 
The company believes that its comparative advantage lies not in managing smallholders but
in research and development, financing and trading.  It seeks smaller operators with greater
familiarity with local growing conditions to manage smallholders.  This is a recent policy
change by Lonrho, and to date only a few firms have established such a relationship with the
firm.  
How is the freedom of choice in selecting a buyer for their cotton likely to affect prices
smallholders receive for their output and vertical coordination more broadly?  Stringfellow's
analysis suggests that while no legal monopsony is in place, the dominance of Lonrho in
Southern and Central Zambia
"...sets the prevailing into mill (seed cotton) price...A South African firm purchased a
ginnery in Chipata, but the distance between this and the Lonrho ginneries (and the17
producing area) is likely to eliminate any incentive for traders to take advantage of
price differentials.  This will limit the degree to which traders at the farmgate can
adjust their prices to compete for purchases."
The Zambia case has an important implication for the question of the effect of a legal
monopsony.  Although there is a de jure freedom for smallholders in marketing their cotton,
the economics of transporting the product and the scale economies of ginning result in a de
facto monopsony.  The effect of eliminating the monopsony in isolation from other actions to
promote vertical coordination has done little to improve smallholder welfare.
In Zimbabwe, liberalization of smallholder cotton marketing has also occurred recently. 
Cotco, the newly commercialized former Cotton Marketing Board provides credit for cotton
production to groups of smallholders.  The capital for mounting this credit system was
secured through government funding, a key difference between this system and the JVC
model in Mozambique.   There is now significant pressure to end the subsidies implicit in the
operation of this system.  Smallholders who receive credit from Cotco are supposed to
market all their cotton through Cotco, but this is not occurring.  Rather, producers only repay
their credit obligations with Cotco and sell the larger portion of their production to other
buyers that pay a higher price.  While Cotco has its credit repaid in this way, it does not
achieve a key related objective: maximizing its capacity utilization to reduce ginning costs. 
Cargill, which now leases two ginning facilities in Zimbabwe, feels that smallholders will
require increased access to credit if they are to further expand their cotton production and
that without government subsidies Cotco may not represent a viable solution.  The problem
of how to extend credit in a free market environment and make sure that smallholders repay
these obligations, particularly in a year of poor production and financial losses, is critically
important.  A possible solution suggested by Cargill management is for Cargill to act as a
facilitator of loan repayment by deducting input costs from cotton payments made to
smallholders and transferring these funds to the creditor. The critical problem with such an
approach is that it begs the question of who will bear the risk of financing smallholder
production when no government-backed credit scheme is available.  In brief, the Zimbabwe
experience points again to the need for policy mechanisms that improve vertical coordination
in the cotton subsector in order to ensure sustainability of smallholder production and
intensification.  Simply ending the JVCs’ geographic monopsonies where private input and
credit markets continue to fail has little probability of solving the system’s more fundamental
problems. 
E. Mali and the Empowerment of Farmers through Village Associations
Smallholder cotton production in the Compagnie Malienne pour le Developpement des
Textiles (CMDT) zone of Mali is characterized by a highly vertically-integrated system
whereby CMDT has responsibility for supporting smallholder production through input
distribution and tied credit and purchasing output in a manner similar to the design of the
JVC model in Mozambique.  In the past twenty years, intensification of input use and
dramatically improved smallholder cotton yields have improved the profitability of cotton to
producers in Mali.  The model has proven successful from a macroeconomic perspective as
well, as cotton now accounts for almost one-half of Mali's export earnings.  Bingen (1997)
shows that the role of farmer organizations (or associationes villagoises (AVs)) has been18
fundamental in this process.  He traces the history of the emergence of the Avs to 1974 when
a CMDT extensionist: 
"...helped villagers organize a protest against dishonest cotton grading and weighing
practices.  Responding to the villagers' demands, the CMDT gradually transferred
responsibility for cotton grading and weighing, equipment and supply orders and
credit management to designated village groups.  After several years of fairly
informal agreements with these groups, the CMDT formalized the relationship by
setting out a series of criteria for establishment of Avs.  In collaboration with the
government, the CMDT also secured World Bank financing to support the
development of management skills within the Avs, especially through a functional
literacy program to ensure the level of literacy and numeracy skills required to fulfill
credit and marketing tasks and the preparation of account books in the Bambara
language." (Bingen, 1997)
Farmer associations have the potential to represent smallholder concerns effectively vis-a-vis
large firms operating in the cotton subsector in Mozambique as well.  In addition to having
benefitted smallholder incomes, smallholder cotton has played a key role in promoting food
security in Mali.  Consider the analysis offered by Dione:
"...the success of CMDT in promoting foodgrain production was achieved through a
strategy centered on a vertically coordinated set of activities (research, extension,
input and credit distribution, and output processing and marketing) for the long-term
growth of cotton production and income.  This income served as an engine to support
gradually the development of food crop production and non-crop activities...(The
promotion of cotton represents) a strategic approach to rural development and
significantly diverges from the approach followed by most rural development
agencies and the traditional food crop - cash crop dichotomy, which is almost
irrelevant in the CMDT case where there was growth in cereals production mainly
because of the growth in farmers' income from cotton production." (emphasis
added) (Dione, 1989)
Cotton-led agricultural growth in Mali's CMDT zone has had additional indirect benefits
such as improving rural literacy and stimulating broader democratization. (Bingen, 1997)
With respect to Mozambique, it is important to recall the mutual interest that the JVCs and
smallholders have in cooperation.  The JVC approach, as it has been implemented, attempts
to control the outgrower and/or limit the risk facing the JVC.  Stringfellow suggests a more
"consensual" approach would be for the firm to develop relationships of increased trust with
producers in which both parties recognize the mutual benefits of cooperation.  If experience
from Mali and elsewhere concerning the positive force of farmer associations in giving
farmers voice is a guide to the Mozambican case, encouraging the growth of such
organizational structures among smallholder cotton producers may be an important part of
the policy solution for cotton to increase its already important role in Mozambique's rural
development.19
IV. Policy Recommendations and Priorities for Future Research
￿ Smallholder cotton can have important micro- and macroeconomic benefits if it is
promoted with a sufficient level of inputs, extension and marketing infrastructure.
Intensification of cotton has even greater benefits for each of the actors in the system.  The
GOM should promote smallholder cotton production in the cotton belt through
strategies which effectively balance smallholder and private sector interests in pursuing
vertical coordination of the subsector.
￿ Improving smallholder capacity to represent their own interests vis-a-vis private sector
firms in the cotton subsector can be an important mechanism to improve the effect of cash-
cropping on smallholder welfare.  In Mali, farmer associations have represented an important
way for farmers to achieve greater power and gain access to fertilizers and other key inputs. 
Village associations have the potential to play a similar role in Mozambique.  NGOs such as
the Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) have been active recently in Nampula in
encouraging the formation and training of village associations.  CLUSA-supported
associations have begun to deal with the JVCs and other private sector firms to improve input
availability and access to tractor services (Personal communication, Alexandre Serrano). 
Note that the current cotton "Regulamento" of the GOM provides for economic agents with
greater than 20 ha of cotton production to sell their cotton freely.  To the extent that
associations could organize farmers with at least this area of cotton production, this could not
only circumvent the problem of monopsony but provide other benefits to participating
smallholders as well.  The GOM and donors should promote the formation of farmer
associations to promote smallholders’ bargaining power with private sector firms. 
Donor support in this area may help build a bridge between the farmer organizations, the
JVCs and formal sector financial institutions in the design of financing systems which
promote intensification and spread the risk associated with smallholder cotton and food crop
production.  
￿ ￿ The process by which the GOM determines minimum producer prices for cotton
should be reviewed.  Yearly changes in the GOM cotton price have not reflected changes in
world market conditions.  For example, the official price jumped from $0.16 to $0.34 per kg
from 1994/95 to 1995/96 while FOB Northern Mozambique prices for cotton fiber dropped
from $1,715 to $1,438 per ton.  Such erratic price policies make long range investment
planning by the JVCs and other private sector firms difficult and create unsustainable price
expectations and uncertainty for smallholders.  A two-stage process whereby a minimum
producer price is announced at the beginning of the agricultural season (September 1) with
the possibility for upward revisions based on prevailing world market conditions at the time
of export is one alternative which should be considered.
￿ The Mozambique Cotton Institute currently lacks the institutional capacity and resources to
represent smallholder interests effectively in JVC zones.  However, governmental oversight
to encourage JVC behavior to benefit smallholders throughout their areas of influence is
important.  The GOM should seek new and innovative mechanisms to bring this about
such as having Institute representation in the decision-making structure of the JVCs,
given that the Government is in fact a partner in these schemes.20
￿ If the GOM wishes to encourage JVC involvement in smallholder food crop
intensification, it should maintain its commitment to abolishing the policy of legal minimum
producer price.  High-input block maize schemes could be profitable to JVCs and generate
attractive returns to smallholder labor if current upper tercile yields could be achieved and a
lower price paid to farmers than the GOM minimum.  The GOM should seek policies
designed to increase rural incomes through productivity enhancing technology
packages (e.g. the high-input block maize scheme or other food crop opportunities)
rather than through unsustainable minimum price policy.  JVCs have an important stake
in improving rural food security and innovative mechanisms should be sought to encourage
their participation.
￿ ￿ The development of suitable cotton varieties with improved ginning outturn ratios is
the subject of on-going research both by CIMSAN (Centro de Investigacao e
Multiplicacao de Sementes de Algodao de Namialo) and Lomaco with support from the
French Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique in Montepuez.  The Government
and donors should place renewed focus on this effort.  Improving ginning outturn ratios
from their current levels of approximately 34 percent to levels achieved in West Africa of 40
to 43 percent could dramatically increase the cotton's impact on smallholder income, the
attractiveness of smallholder cotton to private sector firms and Mozambican export earnings. 
Recall that exporters pay a 3.5 percent tax on cotton fiber exports.  This tax was established
by the GOM for the purpose of supporting activities to promote the cotton subsector
including varietal research.  JVCs have recently questioned what benefits they derive from
this tax.  The GOM should consider using a substantial portion of the revenue from this tax
to support varietal research in collaboration with the national agricultural research system
and the JVCs.  An important longer term issue is developing a mechanism for allocating
these funds which incorporates the perspectives of key cotton subsector participants,
including farmers, in a meaningful way.  The Mozambique Cotton Institute could play an
important role in developing this process.21
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